Abstract. In hyperelliptic curve cryptography, finding a suitable hyperelliptic curve is an important fundamental problem. One of necessary conditions is that the order of its Jacobian is a product of a large prime number and a small number. In the paper, we give a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to test whether the Jacobian of the given hyperelliptic curve of the form Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 + vX satisfies the condition and, if so, gives the largest prime factor. Our algorithm enables us to generate random curves of the form until the order of its Jacobian is almost prime in the above sense. A key idea is to obtain candidates of its zeta function over the base field from its zeta function over the extension field where the Jacobian splits.
Introduction
In (hyper)elliptic curve cryptography, point counting algorithms are very important to exclude the weak curves. For elliptic curves over finite fields, the SEA algorithm (see Schoof [33] and Elkies [8] ) runs in polynomial time (with respect to input size). In case that the characteristic of the coefficient field is small, there are even faster algorithms based on the p-adic method (see e.g. Vercauteren [37] for a comprehensive survey). The p-adic method gives quite efficient point counting algorithms for higher dimensional objects, e.g. Kedlaya [18] , Lercier and Lubicz [23] , Lauder [19] . However, so far, there is no known efficient practical algorithm for hyperelliptic curves of genus two in case that the characteristic of the coefficient field is large.
In theory, Pila [29] generalized the Schoof algorithm to a point counting algorithm for Abelian varieties over finite fields. Nevertheless, a practical implementation is not done even for the Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves of genus two. Current implementations for crypto size curves more or less contain the BSGS process, hence the running time grows exponentially. For crypto size implementations, see Matsuo, Chao and Tsujii [24] , Gaudry and Schost [14] .
On the other hand, Furukawa, Kawazoe and Takahashi [11] gives an explicit formula for the order of Jacobians of curves of type Y 2 = X 5 + aX where a ∈ F × p . However, there are, at most, only 8 isomorphism classes over F p among these curves for each prime p. Their method relies on the binomial expansion of X 5 + aX. The idea was generalized to hyperelliptic curves over prime fields of the form Y 2 = X 5 + a (ibid.) and Y 2 = X 2k+1 + aX in Haneda, Kawazoe and Takahashi [15] . Recently, Anuradha [2] obtained similar formulae for non-prime fields. But their method seems to be applicable only to binomials in X.
In this paper, we consider an intermediate case: our curve is in a certain special form but not as special as was considered in the above papers and time complexity to test one curve is of probabilistic polynomial time. More specifically, we give an algorithm to test whether the order of the Jacobian of a given hyperelliptic curve of genus two in the form Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 + vX has a large prime factor. If so, the algorithm output the prime factor. Moreover, under a certain circumstance (see Remark 6) , our algorithm determines the group order itself.
The order of the Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves Y 2 = X(X 2n + uX n + v) over a prime field are already studied by Leprévost and Morain [21] . In case of n = 2, they gave some explicit formulae for the order of the Jacobian in terms of certain modular functions, whose evaluations are computationally feasible only for special combinations of u and v.
Our method is totally different from the preceding point counting works. Let p ≥ 5 be a prime and let q be a power of p. Let C/F q : Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 +vX be an arbitrary (in view of cryptographic application, randomly) given hyperelliptic curve. We do not require q = p, which implies that our algorithm can be applicable hyperelliptic curves over so-called optimal extension fields. We now observe a key idea of our method. Put r = q 4 . We denote the Jacobian variety of C by J, which is an Abelian variety of dimension two defined over F q . Now J is isogenous over F r to a product of an elliptic curve defined over F r . Hence the (one dimensional part of) zeta function of J as an Abelian variety over F r is a square of the zeta function of the elliptic curve, which is computed by the SEA algorithm. On the other hand, we have some relation between the zeta function of J over F r and over F q . This gives (at most 26) possible orders of J(F q ). For each candidate, we first check that the order is not weak for cryptographic use, that is, the order is a product of a small positive integer and a large prime. If the curve is weak, we stop here. (Note that, if the curve passes the test, its Jacobian is simple over F q .) Then, we take random points of J(F q ) to see whether the prime actually divides #J(F q ). Our algorithm runs in probabilistic polynomial time in log q. In order to find a hyperelliptic curve suitable for cryptography, we repeat the process with randomly given u and v until we obtain a curve with desired properties.
In the case of characteristics two, Hess, Seroussi and Smart [16] proposed an algorithm to construct a verifiably random hyperelliptic curve in a certain family which is suitable for a hyperelliptic cryptosystem. The efficiency of their algorithm in case of large characteristics is not clear. As to products of elliptic curves, Scholten [32] constructs a hyperelliptic curve of genus two for odd prime fields whose Jacobian is isogenous to the Weil restriction of elliptic curves. Both of the works start with elliptic curves while our algorithm starts with the hyperelliptic curve Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 + vX where u and v are given.
Recently Sutherland [35] proposed an algorithm based on a generic group model to produce Abelian varieties from random hyperelliptic curves. When applied to curves of genus two, its running time is quite practical but its heuristic time complexity is of sub-exponential. Although these two algorithms [16] , [35] take random input data, it is highly non-trivial to observe distribution of output of the algorithm. In case of our algorithm, it is obvious that our algorithm generates each curve of type Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 + vX, suitable to cryptography with equal probability if we generate random u and v uniformly.
In case that p ≡ 3 mod 4, the Jacobian has complex multiplications by √ −1 for all u and v (as long as the curve is actually a hyperelliptic curve). This fact can be used to make scalar multiplication faster by the Gallant, Lambert and Vanstone algorithm [12] . We can also take advantage of real multiplications with efficient evaluations (if any) due to Takashima [36] . However we also note that such an efficient endomorphism also speeds up solving discrete log problems Duurasma, Gaudry and Morain [7] .
After the work was completed except for the crypto size numerical experiments, the author learned that Gaudry and Schost [13] completely describes the hyperelliptic curves whose Jacobian is isomorphic to a product of two elliptic curves by an isogeny with kernel Z/2Z ⊕ Z/2Z. Our idea is probably applicable to such curves given by in terms of the Rosenhain form or the invariants (Ω, Υ ) in the notation of [13] . The j-invariants of two elliptic curves will be different but no essential change to our idea is required. However, the author have not derived explicit formulae for these parameters, yet. Recently, Paulhus [28] gave explicit descriptions of splitting of Jacobian into elliptic curves for some curves of genus greater than two. Although use of such curve is a rather questionable, mathematically, it would be interesting to see how often such curves are product of a small number and a prime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some facts on arithmetic properties of the Jacobian varieties. In Section 3, we give an explicit formula of the elliptic curve whose product is isogenous to the Jacobian of a given hyperelliptic curve of the above form. In Section 4, we show how to retrieve possible orders of the Jacobian via the decomposition obtained in the preceding section. In Section 5, we state our algorithm and observe its computational complexity. In Section 6, we give an illustrative small numerical example. In Section 7, we report a result of numerical experiments with cryptographic size parameters.
Throughout the paper, we let p be a prime greater than or equal to 5 and q a power of p. We put r = q 4 .
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Some properties of the Jacobian varieties
We summarize arithmetic properties of the Jacobian varieties used in the later sections. See the surveys Milne [26] , [27] for more descriptions.
Let A/F q be an Abelian variety of dimension d. The (one dimensional part of the) zeta function Z A (T, F q ) is a characteristic polynomial of the q-th power Frobenius map on V l (A) = T l (A) ⊗ Z l Q l where l is a prime different from p and T l (A) is the l-adic Tate module. It known that Z A (T, F q ) ∈ Z[T ] with deg Z A (T, F q ) = 2d and that it is independent of choice of l. It holds that
(1)
Permuting indices if necessary, we may assume that
Let n ∈ N and put s = q n . Since the s-th power map is the n-times iteration of the q-th power map, we see
Let E/F q be an elliptic curve, which is an Abelian variety of dimension 1 over F q . The above items translate to the well known formula
Let C/F q be a hyperelliptic curve of genus two and let J be its Jacobian variety, which is an Abelian variety of dimension two defined over F q . Let z 1,q , . . ., z 4,q be the roots of Z J (T, F q ) arranged as (2) . We see
where
We note |a q | ≤ 4 √ q and |b q | ≤ 6q. We will also use the Hasse-Weil bound
3 Decomposition of the Jacobian
In this section, we give an explicit formula of an elliptic curve whose product is isogenous to the Jacobian of the hyperelliptic curves of our object. Such an decomposition has been more or less known, e.g. Leprévost and Morain [21] , Cassel and Flynn [5, Chap. 14] , and Frey and Kani [9] . Here we derive a formula which is ready to implement our method efficiently.
Let C : Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 + vX be a hyperelliptic curve where u ∈ F q and v ∈ F × q . We denote the Jacobian variety of C by J. There are α, β ∈ F × r such that
We choose and fix
It is straightforward to verify
Define E 1 /F r and E 2 /F r by
Then, we have two covering maps ϕ i : C → E i defined over F r by
They induce maps ϕ * i : Div(E i ) → Div(C) and ϕ i * : Div(C) → Div(E i ). They again induce maps (which are also denoted by) ϕ *
Since 2|[F r : F p ] and p ≥ 5, both E 1 and E 2 are isomorphic to the following elliptic curve in the short Weierstrass from:
Eventually, J is isogenous to E × E over F r . Using (4), we conclude
Remark 1. Observe that in fact γ ∈ F q 2 . By (8), we see that γ ∈ F q if and only if either u = 0 or u = 0 and αβ ∈ F × q (i.e. v is a square element in F q ). Thus, we do not need to run the SEA algorithm to E/F r . Define E ′ /F q (γ) by
Let σ be the trace of the #F q (γ)-th power Frobenius endomorphism on E ′ . We obtain σ by running the SEA algorithm to E ′ /F q (γ). Note that the size of the coefficient field is smaller than the size of F r by a factor of 1/2 or 1/4. Let τ ′ be the trace of the r-th power Frobenius endomorphism on E ′ . Then
Now E is isomorphic to E ′ over F r 2 . Let τ be the trace of the r-th power Frobenius endomorphism on E. Unless j(E) = 0 or j(E) = 1728, we have
(And it is easy to compute τ in case of j(E) = 0 or j(E) = 1728, see e.g. Schoof [34, Sect. 4] .) This device does not affect growth rate of the computational complexity of our algorithm. However practical performance improvement by this is significant, since the most of computational time is spent for the SEA algorithm.
Remark 2. Note that, in fact, E 1 and E 2 are defined over F q (s). Changing the sign of α if necessary in case of q ≡ 3 mod 4, we see s ∈ F q when v is a fourth power element of F × q . In this case J already splits over F q . Note that in case of q ≡ 3 mod 4, any square element in F × q is a fourth power element. Indeed, let ω be a generator of F × q where q = 4k + 3. Then,
Computing possible order of the Jacobian
In this section, we consider how to obtain Z J (T, F q ) from Z J (T, F r ). Actually, this is quite elementary.
Let z 1,q , . . ., z 4,q be the roots of Z J (T, F q ) arranged as (2). Put
with a convention s 0 = 4. Then
for i ≥ 4. In particular, we obtain
Recall that r = q 4 . Hence a r = s 4 and
Recall that J is isogenous to E × E over F r where E is defined by (11) . Let t be the trace of r-th Frobenius map on E. Then, Z E (T, F r ) = T 2 − tT + r. Thus (10) gives
Eliminating b q by computing a resultant of the above two polynomials, we obtain
This yields at most 13 possible values for a q . Note that a q is an integer satisfying |a q | ≤ 4 √ q. In order to find integer solutions of a q , we choose any prime l satisfying l > 8 √ q and factorize the above formula in F l . We only need linear factors. For each F l -root, we check whether it is a genuine root in characteristics zero and its absolute value does not exceed 4 √ q. For each possible a q , we easily obtain at most two possible values of b q satisfying the above equations. Thus, we have obtained at most 26 candidates for #J(F q ).
Remark 3. In oder to solve (13) , one might think of the following way: first we choose a some prime λ (≈ 100, say). Then we factorize (13) over F λ , and lift the solutions to Z/λ n Z where λ n > 8 √ q. By this method, one might think that search for a large prime l is unnecessary. A problem is that there is no simple way to ensure different solutions of (13) have different reductions modulo λ, so that all roots in Z are correctly recovered from modulo λ n solutions. Even after factoring out the trivial root a q = 0 whose multiplicity is four, (13) might have multiple roots and hence its discriminant might be zero. One might think that first perform square-free decomposition and search for a small prime which does not divide the discriminant of square free part of (13) . Still the bit complexity of a square-free decomposition of a univariate polynomial over Z can be very large due to gcd computations and its upper bound is not clear. On the other hand, as we will see in the next section, we can rigorously bound a bit complexity of our algorithm. This is the reason why we use a prime l > 8 √ q.
The algorithm and its complexity
In this section, we analyze a time computational complexity of our algorithm. First, we state our method in a pseudo-code. Then, we show our algorithm terminates in probabilistic polynomial time in log q. We denote the identity element of J by 0 in the following.
In addition to the coefficients of hyperelliptic curve C, we give two more data "cofactor bound" M and a set of "test points" D, which is any subset of J(F q ) satisfying #D > M .
In order that the discrete logarithm problem on J(F q ) is not vulnerable to the Pohlig-Hellman attack [30] , #J(F q ) must be a large prime (at least 160 bit in practice). We request that the largest prime factor is greater than #J(F q )/M , which ensures that the factor is greater than ( √ q − 1) 4 /M . In the following algorithm, M must be less than ( √ q − 1) 2 . In practice, M < 2 8 (at most) in view of efficiency of group operation. So, building up D is easy for such small M .
The largest prime factor of #J(F q ) if it is greater than #J(F q )/M . Otherwise, False. Procedure:
1: Let α 0 , β 0 be the solution of x 2 + ux + v = 0. 2: Find α and β satisfying α 2 = α 0 , β 2 = β 0 . 3: Compute δ and γ by (7) and (8), respectively. 4: Compute #E(F r ) by the SEA algorithm and put t = 1 + r − #E(F r ). 5: Find a prime l satisfying 8 √ q < l ≤ q.
6: Find solutions of (13) modulo l. 7: for each solution τ do:
8: Lift τ ∈ F l to a q ∈ Z so that |a q | ≤ 4 √ q.
9: if a q is even then 10:
for each integer solution b q of (12) satisfying |b q | ≤ 6q do: 11:
if (L ′ is prime) then 16:
Find a point P ∈ D such that dP = 0. 17: Remark 4. Actually, in the SEA algorithm in Step 4, we obtain t before we obtain #E(F q ).
Remark 5. Instead of giving a set D by listing all points, we can specify D by some conditions and we generate elements of D during execution of the above procedure. In the implementation used in the next section, the author used
where ∞ is the point at infinity of C (not J) and the subscript X stands for the X-coordinate. Then, #D ≈ O(q 2 ). It is easy to generate a uniformly random point of D in probabilistic polynomial time. 2 ), the value of L at Step 17 gives #J(F q ). The reason is as follows. Observe that
Hence, there is only one multiple of L ′ in the Hasse-Weil bound (6), which must be #J(F q ).
Remark 7. As we will see (14) below, there exist at least Ω(q/ log q) primes l satisfying 8 √ q < l < q. Thus, average number of primality tests to find l in
Step 5 is O(log q). In an actual implementation, we may search for a prime by testing odd number greater than 8 √ q one by one. Primality tests can be performed by a deterministic polynomial time algorithm by Agrawal, Kayal and Saxena [1] . If we admit the generalized Riemann hypothesis, we can use simple, much faster deterministic algorithm due to Lehmann [20] together with Bach's bound [3] . Since our main interest is in hyperelliptic cryptography, we do not go into complexity arguments on primality tests further.
2 be fixed. Then Algorithm 1 terminates in probabilistic polynomial time in log q (with respect to the bit operations). In case that #J(F q ) is divisible by a prime greater than ( √ q − 1) 4 /M , Algorithm 1 returns the largest prime factor of #J(F q ).
Proof. Note that t, q, a q and b q are integers. Hence a q must be even by (12) . This explains Step 9. If we reach Step 16, we have, as an Abelian group,
where G is an Abelian group of order d. Since gcd(d, L ′ ) = 1, there are at most d points Q ∈ J(F q ) satisfying dQ = 0. Since #D > M , we can find P at Step 16 by testing at most M elements in D.
Since L ′ is a prime, it must be the largest prime factor of #J(F q ), which completes the proof of correctness of the algorithm. Now we consider computational complexity. Note that a bit size of any variables appearing in Algorithm 1 is bounded by c log q where c is a constant depending only on M and the primality test algorithm used in Step 5. Thus we have only to show that, instead of the number of bit operations, the number of arithmetic operations performed in Algorithm 1 is bounded by a polynomial in log q. For a positive real number x, put θ(x) = l≤x θ(x) as usual where l runs over primes less than x. By Chebyshev's theorem [6] , there exist constants C 1 and C 2 such that
for all x > C 2 where K = log 
and thus
with some C 3 , C 4 > 0. Therefore, if we test random odd numbers between 8 √ q and q to find l, an average number of primality tests in Step 5 is less than
for all q > C 4 . In Steps 1, 2 and 6, we need to factorize univariate polynomials over F r or F l . However, the degree of polynomials to be factored is either 2 or 13. Hence the Cantor-Zassenhaus factorization [4] factorizes them in probabilistic polynomial time. The SEA algorithm (even Schoof's algorithm alone) runs in polynomial time. Summing up, we obtain our assertions.
⊓ ⊔ Remark 8. We need further tests for suitability to hyperelliptic curve cryptosystem. These includes (but not limited to) the following conditions. The minimal embedding degree (in the sense of Hitt [17] ) should not be too small to avoid multiplicative DLP reduction by Frey and Rück [10] . If M is close to ( √ q − 1)
2 by some reason, the largest prime must not be p to avoid additive DLP reduction by Rück [31] .
A numerical example
We give an illustrative example of our algorithm. We set M = 16. Let q = p = 509 and consider C : Reducing modulo l, we obtain 0 = a q 16 + 138a q 14 + 58a q 12 + 46a q 10 + 63a q 8 + 94a q 6 + 136a q 4 = (a q 2 + 56a q + 170)(a q 2 + 135a q + 170)(a q 2 + 150)
where a q is the reduction of a q modulo l. Hence a q = −28, 0, 28. In case of a q = −28, Eq. (12) 
Cryptographic size implementation
In this section, we report implementation results for cryptographic size parameters. The results show that our algorithm certainly produces hyperelliptic curves for cryptographic use with an acceptable computational complexity. In reality, almost all computation time is consumed in an elliptic curve point counting (
Step 4 in Algorithm 1). We begin with remarks on an elliptic curve point counting.
First, deployment of Remark 1 is very important. Assume that we use the Karatsuba algorithm for multiplications. Then Remark 1 reduces running time by a factor of 2 2+2 log 2 3 ≈ 36.2 in theory. More importantly, a number of modular polynomials necessary for the SEA algorithm is approximately halved.
Next the action of the Frobenius map can be computed more efficiently than a straightforward method. Let p be a prime and let n be an integer greater than 1. In this paragraph, we put q = p n . Assume that we use a variant of the babystep giant-step algorithm due to Maurer and Müller [25] to find an eigenvalue of the Frobenius endomorphism. Then a bottleneck of Elkies' point counting algorithm for elliptic curves defined over F q is a computing action of the q-th power map and
. To reduce their computational time, we use an algorithm due to von zur Gathen and Shoup [39] with a modification to take the action of p-th power map on F q into consideration. See Vercauteren [38, Sect. 3.2] in the case p = 2. Even in the case of n = 2 (which is the case we need), the modification saves much time. The overall performance improvement of elliptic curve point counting with this technique highly depends on an implementation and field parameters. In author's implementation (which uses the Elkies primes only) for p ≈ 2 87 and n = 2, the improvement was approximately in range 20 ∼ 40% depending on elliptic curves. Now we back to our algorithm. In what follows, q is the cardinality of the coefficient field of hyperelliptic curves to be generated. Assume that we need the Jacobian variety whose bit size of the group order is N . Then, log q ∼ = N/2. Note we apply the SEA algorithm to elliptic curves over F q 2 . Thus we can paraphrase that time to test one random hyperelliptic curve of the form Y 2 = X 5 +uX 3 +vX is comparable to time to test one random elliptic curve if their group sizes are the same. Of course, this is only rough comparison. For example, in the elliptic curve case, we can employ early abort strategy (see Lercier[22, Sect. 4 .1]), whereas we need to complete the SEA algorithm in our Algorithm 1.
Since our curves Y 2 = X 5 +uX 3 +vX are in rather special form, they may be less likely suitable for cryptographic use. The author has no idea for theoretical results on this point. To observe the circumstance, the following numerical experiments are performed. Take a 87 bit number A = 0x5072696d654e756d626572 in hexadecimal (the ASCII code for the string "PrimeNumber"). For each curve, if the order of its Jacobian is a product of an integer less than 2 10 and a prime, the value of the integer is listed in the second column. So, the probability to obtain the best possible curves in the above experiment is 13 2000 = 0.0065. By the prime number theorem, a "density" of primes around A 2 /2 is approximately 1/ log e (A 2 /2) ≈ 0.0084. In the case p = A−677, no best possible curve was found in the above computation. But further computation finds that the order of the Jacobian of the curve with u = 93589879629357849667104247 and v = 2243510914087562678935813 is a product of 2 and a prime 4729205283037531066627852907078079919137325850534317.
This suggests that we can find a curve of the form Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 + vX for cryptographic use for any p. However, one might want to generate a random prime p and u ∈ F p , v ∈ F × p for each curve. Another observation is that curves with cofactor 6 and 12 were not found, where four curves with cofactor 18 were found. The author has no explanation of such phenomena.
The order of Jacobians of the curves Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 + vX seems less likely to be a product of a small positive integer and a large prime than a random integer. However, our experiments also suggests that our algorithm generates hyperelliptic curves with acceptable computational time.
Conclusion
We presented an efficient algorithm to test whether a given hyperelliptic curve Y 2 = X 5 + uX 3 + vX over F q is suitable or not and if suitable, the largest prime divisor of the number of F q -rational points of the Jacobian of the curve. This enables us to use a randomly generated hyperelliptic curve in the form which is supposed to be suitable for hyperelliptic curve cryptography.
Although our family of curves is far more general than the curves given by binomials, it is still in a very special form. The difficulty of discrete log problems on the simple but not absolutely simple Jacobian is open.
